In October 2012, a panel of the D.C. Circuit dealt a blow to the United States' postSeptember 11, 2001 decade-long experiment with military commissions as a forum for trying Guantanamo Bay detainees. Specifically, the court concluded that prior to the 2006 statutory reforms, military commission jurisdiction was limited to violations of internationally-recognized war crimes; that providing material support to terrorism was not an internationally-recognized war crime; and that the military commission conviction of Salim Hamdan for material support charges based on pre-2006 conduct was therefore invalid. Three months later, a panel of the D.C. Circuit reached the same conclusion with respect to conspiracy and solicitation charges, and vacated the conviction and life sentence of Guantanamo Bay detainee Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul. That case is now on appeal to an en banc (full court) panel of the D.C. Circuit. This article analyses the D.C. Circuit's ruling in Hamdan's case, explaining why the ultimate holding is the right one, even though some of the reasoning is flawed, and why the ruling should be upheld on appeal. It also highlights the many unresolved questions and the implications for the future of military commissions at Guantanamo Bay. As the article explains, the D.C. Circuit's rulings are a major victory for the rule of law and a major defeat for commissions.
Introduction
Salim Hamdan is a familiar name to those steeped in the United States' postSeptember 11, 2001, experiment with military commissions. Among the first Guantanamo Bay detainees to be charged by the Bush administration's hastily * Jennifer Daskal is an Assistant Professor at American University Washington College of Law.
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[jdaskal@wcl.american.edu] concocted commissions, he filed multiple pre-trial challenges to their legality. In 2006, the United States (US) Supreme Court ruled in his favour, declaring that the commission system then in place violated US statutory and international law, and precluding his trial from going forward before it even began. 2 The US government charged Hamdan once again, and he was ultimately convicted of one count of providing material support for terrorism and acquitted of one count of conspiracy. 3 In October 2012, a US federal appeals court vacated the conviction. 4 The three-judge panel from the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals (the 'D.C. Circuit') concluded that, prior to passage of the 2006 MCA, military commissions had jurisdiction over violations of the international laws of war only; providing material support for terrorism was not a recognized international law of war offence; and, based on its analysis of Congress's intent, could not be applied retroactively to conduct that took place prior to 2006.
5 Three months later, another three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit reached the same conclusion with respect to the charges of conspiracy and solicitation, and vacated the life sentence of Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul. 6 An en banc (full court) panel of the D.C. Circuit subsequently agreed to review the Al Bahlul decision, which also provides a vehicle for reconsidering the underlying ruling in Hamdan's case. 7 The D.C. Circuit's rulings ç which ought to, and likely will, be upheld by the en banc court ç cast a pall on the work of the commissions to date. The other five convictions meted out by the commissions since their inception all involve charges of material support and conspiracy. In three out of the Al Bahlul represented himself at trial, and did not contest evidence that he had served as Osama bin Laden's personal secretary for public relations, prepared 'martyr wills' for two of the 9/11 hijackers, and produced propaganda calling for volunteers to join the jihad against the United States, among other allegations. ibid., at 1163^1164. He is currently being held at the detention centre in Guantanamo Bay. five, providing material support for terrorism and/or conspiracy were the only charges. 8 The rulings also fatally undermine the Obama administration's ability to try several of the 30-plus Guantanamo detainees it previously deemed eligible for prosecution ç for whom civilian, federal courts are not currently a viable option due to statutory restrictions on bringing the detainees to the United States. 9 At the same time, the Hamdan panel's ruling (Hamdan II) leaves critical issues about the future of military commissions unresolved. It does not preclude the ongoing prosecution of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and his three co-defendants accused of planning the 9/11 attacks, or other high-value detainees who are charged with what most scholars agree constitute internationally recognized war crimes. But it sidesteps central questions about the application of US constitutional law protections to military trials at Guantanamo, and about the viability of material support, conspiracy, and other analogous charges to conduct that takes place after the passage of the 2006 MCA. The answers to these still-unresolved questions matter critically to the outcome of the still-ongoing trials and to the viability ç and effectiveness ç of the military commissions system going forward. This article examines both the importance and limitations of the decisions, and explains why the government is likely to ç and should ç lose its appeal. Section 2 provides key background on the military commissions at issue and the relevant facts and permutations of Salim Hamdan's and Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul's cases. Section 3 analyses the Hamdan II ruling in detail. It illustrates the lengths to which the panel went to avoid key questions about the extraterritorial reach of the US Constitution to Guantanamo and why that aspect of the opinion should be overturned. Contrary to the government's assertion, however, the flawed analysis does not change the ultimate holding ç that commission jurisdiction is limited to violations of recognized international law offences, at least with respect to any offences that took place prior to 2006. Section 4 addresses the policy implications for the detentions at Guantanamo Bay, the future of military commissions, and the US counterterrorism policy going forward.
Both for what the panel rightly concluded and for what it left unresolved, the opinion underscores the hubris of the entire military commission experiment, and why, despite the commendable efforts of those currently involved, it is an experiment that ought to finally come to an end.
The Background
On 13 November 2001, President George W. Bush authorized the trial by military commission of any non-citizen who 'is or was' a member of al Qaeda, or 'has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism' aimed at or harmful to the United States.
10 Four months later, the Department of Defense issued Military Commissions Order Number 1, laying out the trial procedures for military commissions.
11 Among other notable features, the procedures granted the presiding judge wide latitude to exclude the defendant from portions of the trial and deny him access to 'protected information' ç broadly defined ç that was presented to the military commission panel (the military commission equivalent of a jury).
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On 3 July 2003, the Bush administration named Hamdan as among the first Guantanamo detainees eligible for trial by these newly-created military commissions. 13 Hamdan promptly raised pre-trial challenges to the prosecution, and his case wound its way to the US Supreme Court. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (Hamdan I), the US Supreme Court declared the commissions then in place unlawful ç ruling that they violated both the US and international law. The Court highlighted commission rules that gave the presiding judge wide discretion to close the courtroom to the accused, prevent him from viewing 'protected information,' and permit the liberal introduction of hearsay ç thereby denying him the opportunity to confront evidence and witnesses against him.
14 The Supreme Court concluded that these and other deviations between military commissions and courts-martial systems (which are used to try US servicepersons) violated the US statutory requirement of uniformity between the two systems of justice 'insofar as practicable'. 15 The Supreme Court also concluded that these deviations violated the international law requirement that trials be conducted by 'regularly constituted courts '. 16 In its analysis of the statutory basis for commissions, the court further emphasized that the jurisdiction of military commissions was limited to what was authorized by the relevant statute in place, 10 U.S.C. x 821 ç which confined commission jurisdiction to those offences that 'by statute or the law of war may be tried by military commissions'. 17 Of particular relevance to Hamdan II and the pending appeal, a majority of the Justices defined the term 'law of war' referenced in 10 U.S.C. x 821 as referring to the international law of war.
18
A plurality of the court (four Justices) went even further ç concluding that the charge of 'conspiracy' is not a cognizable offence under the law of war.
19
In reaching this conclusion, the plurality emphasized that '[t]he crime of ''conspiracy'' has rarely if ever been tried as such in this country by any lawof-war military commission not exercising some other form of jurisdiction, and does not appear in either the Geneva Conventions or the Hague 14 Ibid., at 621^625. 15 Ibid., at 622 (citing 10 U.S.C. x 836(b)). 16 Ibid., at 632^633 (' At a minimum, a military commission can be ''regularly constituted'' by the standards of our military justice system only if some practical need explains deviations from court-martial practice. As we have explained ::: no such need has been demonstrated here.') (Citations omitted). 17 Ibid., at 593 note 23 ('Whether or not the President has independent power, absent congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his powers.') (emphasis added). See also ibid., at 641 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing the authority to convene military commissions as 'limited' by what was authorized in 10 U.S.C. x 821). Although the court described Ex Parte Quirin's conclusion that 10 U.S.C. x 821 and its predecessor (10 U.S.C. x 815) provided 'authorization' for military commissions as 'controversial', it declined to revisit the issue. Ibid., at 593. 18 548 U.S., at 641 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (defining 'law of war' referenced in 10 U.S.C. x 821 as the 'body of international law governing armed conflict'); Ibid., at 603 (plurality) (describing act as a cognizable 'law of war' offence when 'universal agreement in this country and internationally' recognize it as such). 19 Ibid., at 595^612 (plurality opinion). But see ibid., at 697^705 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (concluding that conspiracy is a law of war crime 31 Congress further asserted that it did 'not establish new crimes that did not exist before the date of enactment', and thus, the Act 'does not preclude trial for offenses that occurred before the date of enactment'. 32 In other words, Congress sought to legislate away any potential ex post facto concerns.
A. The Trial, Conviction, and Appeal
With new statutory authority in hand, in 2007 the US Department of Defense recharged Hamdan with one count of conspiracyand one count of providing material support for terrorism. The charges were based, among other things, an alleged agreement to murder US or coalition service members (the conspiracy charge) and his role as a driver and body guard for Osama bin Laden (the material support for terrorism charge). After a two-week trial, a military commission panel found him not guilty of the conspiracy charge, but guilty of five of the eight factual specifications supporting the material support for terrorism charge.
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Hamdan was sentenced to 66 months' confinement, and credited with 61 months and 7 days for the time already detained. In November 2008, the United States transferred Hamdan toYemen. He was released in January 2009.
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Hamdan appealed the conviction, arguing that providing material support for terrorism was not a traditional law of war offence, and therefore Congress lacked the authority to make it a crime triable by military commission. 39 The CMCR concluded that Congress's authority to safeguard the nation during the time of war ç as reflected in its war powers granted by Article I of the US Constitution ç included the discretion to broadly define offences triable by military commissions, and that, in any event, the material support charge codified a pre-existing law of war violation. 40 The CMCR garnered what it deemed extensive support for the proposition that providing material support for terrorism was a pre-existing offence, citing Civil War and World War II cases, UN Security Council resolutions and municipal laws on terrorism. 41 The CMCR also rejected the Equal Protection challenge, concluding that the relevant part of the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution did not apply to aliens in Guantanamo, and that even if it did, there would be no Equal Protection violation.
42
Hamdan appealed to the D.C. Circuit. 43 In a notable about-face, the government eschewed much of the CMCR's analysis, as well as its own arguments to Congress's authority to define war crimes ç widely citing Congress's authority to Define and Punish offences against the law of nations, to provide for the common defence, to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, and to declare war and make rules concerning captures, along with the necessary and proper clause. US Const., Art. I. sec. 8, cls. 1, 10^14, 18. The CMCR also cited the President's Article II executive power and commander in chief authority, as well his duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executive and his power to appoint and commission officers of the United States. U.S. Const., Art. II, sec. the CMCR. Thus, whereas the government had previously argued that material support for terrorism was an internationally recognized law of war offence ç a position that the CMCR adopted ç it abandoned this claim on appeal. 44 It instead offered a new ç and novel ç theory that material support for terrorism was a recognized offence under the so-called 'U.S. common law of war'. 45 It defined the 'U.S. common law of war' as reflecting the 'longstanding historical practice of the Executive Branch', 46 and focused the court's attention on many of the same Civil War era precedents that it had formerly relied on to assert an international law of war violation. 47 The government thus claimed the existence of a separate domestic law of war independent of the international law of war ç derived solely from domestic law precedent, and without regard to its acceptance (or lack thereof) by the international community.
A three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit reversed. The panel rejected the government's newfound reliance on a domestic common law of war, and instead concluded that the relevant statute at the time of Hamdan's conduct ç 10 U.S.C. x 821 ç authorized military commission trials for violations of the international law of war only. 48 It further concluded that the Act itself ç independent of the constitutional Ex Post Facto Clause ç prohibited the retroactive prosecution of crimes that were not international law of war offences or (like spying) explicitly described by relevant statutes at the time they were committed. 49 Because ç as the government now conceded ç material support for terrorism was not an international law of war offence, the charge could not be applied retroactively and Hamdan's conviction was invalid. The government's briefing also made clear that it disagreed with the underlying ç and controlling ç ruling in Hamdan II.
53 Thus, while it did not appeal the Hamdan ruling directly, it sought en banc (full court) review of the Al Bahlul decision, which provided an alternative and arguably more favourable vehicle for the government to attack the Hamdan II decision. 54 Specifically, the government challenged Hamdan II's conclusion that military commissions are limited to the retroactive prosecution of recognized international law of war offences, and instead argued that it can prosecute offences that fall under a separate domestic common law of war. The government seems to have concluded that it has a better argument with respect to conspiracy than material support, and may have wanted to pursue a case that presented both charges. In addition, Hamdan is a free man, whereas al Bahlul remains in US custody pursuant to a life sentence, thus obviating any potential mootness concerns. I predict that the government will lose its appeal, as it should.
Analysis
Hamdan II's statutory analysis, which appears to be motivated by a deep aversion to the application of constitutional law provisions (in this case, the Ex Post Facto Clause) to the detentions at Guantanamo Bay, is fatally flawed. But, contrary to the government's assertions, the flawed statutory analysis does not change the ultimate holding.
Rather it converts what the Hamdan II panel deemed a statutory violation into a constitutional one. The government is still prohibited from retroactively prosecuting as a war crime pre-2006 conduct that did not amount to a recognized international law of war offence at the time it was committed, but as a matter of constitutional rather than statutory law. Because, as the government itself has conceded, neither providing material support for terrorism, nor conspiracy, nor solicitation were recognized international law of war offences as of 2006, the convictions of both Hamdan and al Bahlul are unlawful and should be vacated.
A. Contorted Constitutional Avoidance
One of the most notable features of the Hamdan II panel's opinion is the length to which it goes to avoid addressing the underlying question about the application of the US Constitution to Guantanamo. The Hamdan II panel takes Congress's clear statements that the offences listed in the 2006 MCA can be applied retroactively, and reads into it an unstated Congressional intent: Congress 'would not have wanted new crimes to be applied retroactively'.
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Thus, it turns what seems an unambiguous assertion by Congress that the listed offences could be applied retroactively into a conditional one ç the offences can be applied retroactively so long as they describe pre-existing crimes. In so doing, the panel incorporates an ex post facto principle into the terms of the MCA itself, and thereby avoids the question as to whether or how the US Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause applies.
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While clever, this re-interpretation of the statute's plain language is insupportable. 62 As the US Supreme Court has stated over and over again, statutory analysis should begin with the text and end there, absent ambiguity. 63 Here, there was no ambiguity. Congress did not state that 'to the extent the provisions Moreover, the legislative history suggests that Congress was well aware of the disputed nature of its assertion, but chose to include this seemingly unequivocal language nonetheless. The House of Representatives' Armed Service Committee Report, for example, explicitly notes the unresolved debate as to whether conspiracy constitutes a traditional war crime, yet concludes that it is. The Committee Report cites Justice Thomas's opinion in Hamdan I as providing the relevant support for this conclusion. 65 Notably, Justice Thomas rejects a requirement of plain and unambiguous precedent as a precondition for identifying a traditional war crime. Yet, the Hamdan II reads such a requirement of into the statute, and then claims that it is what Congress intended.
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The question that the panel worked so hard to avoid ç whether or not the Ex Post Facto Clause applies ç should not have been a difficult one for the court. Notably, the presiding military judge in Hamdan's commission case, the Court of Military Commissions Review, and the government all implicitly assumed that the Ex Post Facto clause applies. 67 The government has since explicitly acknowledged that it does apply. 68 This is in stark contrast to arguments with respect to the Equal Protection Clause. 69 As the government now recognizes, the US Supreme Court's ruling in Boumediene v. Bush effectively compels this result. In Boumediene, the Supreme Court ruled that the Suspension Clause ç which prohibits Congress from suspending the writ of habeas corpus except in limited circumstances ç applies to the United States' detentions in Guantanamo. 70 While the Boumediene ruling was limited to the application of the Suspension Clause only, and did not address the applicability of other Constitutional provisions, the similarities in both form and function between the Suspension Clause and Ex Post Facto make it exceedingly unlikely that the Suspension Clause would apply, and the Ex Post Facto would not.
As a matter of form (i.e. placement), both the Suspension Clause and Ex Post Facto Clause are found in Article I, section 9 of the US Constitution. 71 As a matter of function, both the Suspension Clause and the Ex Post Facto Clause, operate as structural limits on the government's power ç preventing Congress from legislating in certain ways. 72 The Suspension Clause prohibits Congress from suspending the writ of habeas corpus, except in narrow circumstances, and the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits Congress from retroactively criminalizing conduct. 73 These structural provisions are in contrast to the 68 See supra note 58. The government, however, suggests that it applies differently (less stringently) than in ordinary criminal cases, and does not preclude al Bahlul's prosecution; Govt Br., Al Bahlul v. U.S., supra note 62, at 65 (' Acknowledging, as the government does, that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies here, it does not follow that the Clause applies in the same fashion as it does to ordinary criminal proceedings.'). 69 See Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d, at 1318 (agreeing with military commission judge that constitutional equal protection guarantees do not extend to aliens tried by military commissions at Guantanamo); Govt Br., Hamdan v. U.S., supra note 44, at 76 (describing the 'hurdle' that Hamdan faces in convincing the court that the Equal Protection Clause applies). Due Process Clause and other constitutional law provisions (like the Equal Protection Clause) which are deemed to confer individual rights, 74 and which the D.C. Circuit has said (wrongly, in my opinion) do not apply to aliens held at Guantanamo, even after the Supreme Court's ruling in Boumediene.
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In fact, the applicability of the Ex Post Facto Clause to the Guantanamo Bay detainees ought to be even easier than the Suspension Clause analysis. In Boumediene, the court focused extensively on the practical considerations and obstacles in running the writ, noting the 'costs' to holding the Suspension Clause applicable, but ultimately finding them non-dispositive. 76 No analogous practical obstacles arise with respect to the application of the Ex Post Facto Clause, which simply prohibits Congress from legislating in particular ways without generating any corresponding procedural or attorney-access rights for detainees.
Ultimately, the panel's flawed statutory interpretation, while notable, is not fatal to the Court's holding. It illustrates the lengths to which the Hamdan II panel was willing to go to avoid extending any constitutional rights protections to the Guantanamo Bay detainees, yet does not change the ultimate result. Application of the Ex Post Facto Clause yields the same non-retroactivity rule, albeit as a matter of constitutional, not statutory law. Put simply, Congress may have thought it was merely 'codify[ing]' extant law of war offenses; but if it was wrong ç which it was ç their retroactive application violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. 81 Second, the court concludes that the 'law of war' referenced in Article 21 refers to the 'international law of war'.
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As an initial matter it is worth noting that the Hamdan II panel's interpretation of military commission jurisdiction as being restricted to international law of war violations should not be confused with a newfound embrace of international law. Rather, the panel makes clear that it deems itself bound by Supreme Court precedent in its interpretation of Article 21, and is rife with scepticism about the 'imprecise' and 'vague' contours of international law. 83 It demands 'significant caution' before permitting civil or criminal liability based on an alleged violation of international law. 84 Thus, while the panel describes Article 21 as one of those discrete instances in which Congress has explicitly incorporated international law into the text of a statute, it makes clear it does not endorse this form of legislating. 85 In fact, Judge Kavanaugh, albeit writing for himself alone, explicitly reminds Congress that it could be a 'leader' and not just a 'follower' in the international community in defining prospective military commission jurisdiction.
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The government, however, challenges even this reluctant reliance on international law. According to the government, Article 21 was a 'savings statute'designed to preserve, not restrict, the full range of previously exercised military commission jurisdiction. 87 In the government's view, previously exercised jurisdiction encompasses conspiracy, solicitation and providing material support for terrorism ç offences that fall under the so-called 'U.S. law of war.' Not persuasive, explains the government: The Court and commentators were merely describing one set of offences that could be tried by military commissions ç not the full range of permissible jurisdiction. 93 But outside a single, and unclear, reference by Justice Stevens as to Article 21 requiring compliance with the ' American law of war', 94 the government does not produce any judicial sources that describe Article 21 as referring to anything akin to a 'U.S. common law of war', as distinct from the international law of war. (Nor does it anywhere explain the quantum and quality of precedent necessary to establish a 'domestic' law of offence.) The government's interpretation thus runs headlong 89 Ibid., at 11. 90 Hamdan, 548 U.S., at 641 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also ibid., at 603 (plurality) (concluding that an act is a law of war offence when 'universal agreement and practice both in this country and internationally' recognize it as such) (internal quotation marks omitted); ibid., at 610 (analysing international sources to determine whether conspiracy was 'recognized violation of the law of war'). 91 317 U.S., at 29; see ibid., at 27^28 (The 'law of war' is 'that part of the law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals.) (emphasis added). 92 696 F. 3d, at 1248^1249 (providing additional citations in support of its conclusion that the law of war referenced in 10 U.S.C., 
Fair Notice and International Law
The Hamdan II panel rightly emphasizes the importance of fair notice as 'a foundation of the rule of law in the U.S.'. It thus expresses deep scepticism about imposing criminal law liability based on 'vague' and 'imprecise' standards ç demanding 'firm grounding' as a pre-condition for imposing criminal liability based on a purported international law violation. 96 The D.C. Circuit panel's analysis echoes a plurality of Supreme Court justices that, in Hamdan I, similarly emphasized importance of 'plain and unambiguous precedent' in cases where the relevant, prosecutable offences are not defined by statute or treaty ç as was the case with respect to most offences subject to military commission jurisdiction prior to 2006.
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At the broadest level, the very concept of a distinct US common law of war fails to satisfy this requirement of firm grounding and fair notice. In fact, even the US government, prior to its about-face in its initial appeal to the D.C. Circuit, did not rely on the so-called domestic law of war in prior arguments to the CMCR. Not only is there no clarity as to what constitutes this distinct body of law, but, as Jens Ohlin has noted, the notion of a 'U.S. common law of war' that is distinct from an 'international law of war' contravenes the very essence and purpose of the law of war as a reciprocally-binding body of law. 98 As al Bahlul put it to the D.C. Circuit: '[i]f there is a ''U.S. law of war'' then there is a ''Syrian law of war,'' a ''Russian law of war'' and an ''Iranian law of war''' ç a state of affairs that would undercut the very purpose of the law of war in setting 'minimum standards of conduct applicable in armed conflict '. 99 Moreover, even if one accepts the concept of a 'U.S. law of war', the government only produces a small number of cases in support of its specific claims with respect to providing material support for terrorism, conspiracy and solicitation ç many of which do not directly support its claims. As the Hamdan II panel observed, the handful of obscure Civil War era cases cited in support of material support charges being as covered by the 'U.S. law of war' do not actually involve a charge of providing material support for terrorism, but instead involve charges akin to aiding and abetting. 100 The offences of conspiracy and solicitation fare no better. While the government calls the 'traditional practice ::: particularly clear with respect to conspiracy', and cites World War II cases alongside the Civil War cases in support of this proposition, 101 this purported clarity has already been disagreed with by a plurality of the Supreme Court. As the Hamdan I plurality concluded, the precedent cited by the government includes cases in which either the conspiracy charge was also accompanied by a completed offence or the overt acts were substantial enough to independently constitute an attempt offence. 102 It does not include cases in which inchoate conspiracy is charged a stand-alone offence, as was done in al Bahlul's case. This hardly satisfies the requirement of fair notice that the Hamdan II panel rightly demanded. 103 The government responds to this critique by both repeating claims that have been largely rejected by a plurality of the Supreme Court 104 and effectively shifting the burden to al Bahlul. In its briefing in support of rehearing en banc, the government emphasized the absence of any authority supporting a requirement that conspiracy be accompanied by a completed offence or attempt. 105 But the absence of a counterfactual does not establish firm grounding; rather, it turns the entire concept of fair notice on its head. The burden is not on al Bahlul to show that such prosecutions were categorically prohibited, but on the government to show sufficiently clear precedent to provide fair notice. The government's reliance on a handful of cases and commentators simply failed to do so here.
Jury Trial Requirement
Even were the reliance on US common law somehow convincing to the en banc court, the government's approach bumps up against yet another constitutional law concern. As Professor Stephen Vladeck has persuasively argued, the jury trial provisions of the US Constitution pose an independent limit to the scope of military commissions. 106 This is because the US Constitution's jury trial requirements allow for only a small number of implicit and explicit exceptions. While in Ex Parte Quirin, a unanimous Supreme Court concluded that 'offenses committed by enemy belligerents against the law of war' were among the implicit exceptions, 107 the Court interpreted the 'law of war' as tethered to the international law of war. Elsewhere, the Supreme Court has emphasized that such exceptions ought to be narrowly construed. 108 Whether an implicit exception to the jury trial requirements also extends to prosecutions for violations of the 'U.S. common law of war' is an open question. Professor Vladeck has persuasively argued it should not. 109 At a minimum, it is an issue that needs to be squarely addressed if the government's theory of commission jurisdiction based on a US common law of war were to be accepted. 110 But, at least in part a result of the D.C. Circuit Court's ruling, the military commission Chief Prosecutor, Brigadier General Mark Martins, now puts that number at 20 at most. 117 The rulings thus deprive some subset of detainees what is may be their best ticket out. Of the four detainees transferred out of Guantanamo over the past two years, two were convicted by military commission. (The other two were the only remaining detainees cleared for outright release, as opposed to transfer; they had been cleared for release by the Bush administration.) Meanwhile, the rulings arguably complicate closure efforts ç making it politically more difficult to make transfer decisions without being able to point to a conviction and sentence as setting a reasonable end date on the period of detention.
Third, the rulings highlight, once again, the difficulty of setting up a new system of justice from scratch. To be sure, the trials of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and co-defendants accused of plotting the September 11 attacks, and Abd al-Rahm al-Nashiri, accused of participating in the 1998 USS Cole bombing, can continue relatively unaffected. 118 The ruling also did not deter the Department of Defense from initiating charges against the alleged al Qaeda operative Abd al Hadi Iraqi for, among other things, perfidy and an alleged attack on a military helicopter. 119 The Chief Prosecutor, Brig. Gen. Mark Martins, is committed to making these trials as fair and transparent as possible. But no matter how successful he ends up being (and I have a lot of faith in him), the cases will be undoubtedly subject to host of legal challenges ç with key issues still unresolved, including the scope of constitutional law protections, the start of hostilities as it relates to the jurisdiction of commissions (at issue in Nashiri's case), and day-to-day issues related to the management of the courtroom and attorney^client communications. 120 Meanwhile, the prospective viability of commissions as a vehicle for prosecuting material support, conspiracy and other analogous charges remains an open question. Only Judge Kavanaugh, writing for himself alone, reached the issue ç concluding that international law norms need not bind the commissions going forward. 121 In Kavanaugh's view, the international law limits on commission jurisdiction imposed by 10 U.S.C. x 821 only apply retroactively; nothing precludes Congress from lifting these restrictions prospectively. 122 Thus, according to Kavanaugh's analysis, the offences of providing material support for terrorism, conspiracy and solicitation could all form the basis for prospective commission liability, even if they could not be tried retroactively.
In reaching this conclusion, Judge Kavanaugh derives the authority to prescribe military commission jurisdiction from Congress's Article I war powers. He explicitly contrasts Congress's Article I war powers, which he describes as 'not defined or constrained by international law' with Congress's power to 'define and Punish ::: Offenses against the Law of Nations', which on its face is delimited at least to some extent by international law.
123 But this analysis ignores the potential jury trial problem described above ç a constraint that may ultimately prove fatal to this approach. 124 Even where Congress is permitted to subject international terrorism suspects to civilian, criminal charges not recognized by international law (such as material support for terrorism), the viability of prosecution by military court does not necessarily follow. Rather, the jury trial requirement poses a separate and additional constraint on the breadth of military commission jurisdiction.
Whether the rest of the court demurred from addressing the prospective scope of commission jurisdiction out of disagreement with Judge Kavanaugh or genuine respect for the doctrine of constitutional avoidance is unclear. But as a practical matter the ruling leaves the prospective viability of military commissions as a vehicle for prosecuting material support for terrorism, conspiracy and solicitation ç often the most (or only) viable charges if there is neither a completed offence nor clear evidence of a defendant's involvement in a completed law of war offence ç in question. Resolution of this question is essential to the future viability and relative effectiveness of the commissions. 
Conclusion
In Hamdan II, a panel ç a conservative panel no less ç of the D.C. Circuit threw a wrench in the viability of military commissions to prosecute a large portion of the 30-some cases once slated for such prosecutions. While the panel engaged in contorted statutory analysis to declare Hamdan's prosecution unlawful, its ultimate holding is sound. The en banc panel should, and likely will, affirm the holding, albeit on constitutional, rather than statutory, law grounds. This is a momentous ç and correct ç result. It curtails the ability of commissions to prosecute any but the few Guantanamo detainees accused of traditional law of war offences. It is both a stark reminder of the difficulties ç and pitfalls ç of trying to set up a new system of justice from scratch, and a testament to judicial checks and balance put in place by the 2006 MCA and the United States' ultimate respect for judicial review and the rule of law. Meanwhile, the ruling leaves open key and pressing questions about the viability of commissions to prospectively prosecute offences of providing material support for terrorism, conspiracy and solicitation ç and other offences not well established under the international law of war. When compared with the track record of federal courts, which have successfully prosecuted approximately 500 terrorism cases during the same 11 years that the Guantanamo commissions have struggled to prosecute seven, 126 it is hard to see why ç other than blind ideological commitment ç commissions of the type created in Guantanamo Bay ought to be the way forward. 
